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By Brent D. Fulton, Jaime S. King, Daniel R. Arnold, Alexandra D. Montague, Samuel M. Chang,
Thomas L. Greaney, and Richard M. Scheffler

States’ Merger Review Authority
Is Associated With States
Challenging Hospital Mergers, But
Prices Continue To Increase
ABSTRACT States can challenge proposed hospital mergers by using
antitrust laws to prevent anticompetitive harms. This observational study
examined additional state laws—principally charitable trust, nonprofit
corporation, health and safety, and certificate-of-need laws—that can
serve as complements and substitutes for antitrust laws by empowering
states to be notified of, review, and challenge proposed hospital mergers
through administrative processes. During the period 2010–19, 862
hospital mergers were proposed, but only forty-two (4.9 percent) were
challenged by states, including thirty-five by states without federal
involvement, of which twenty-five (71.4 percent) originated in the eight
states with the most robust merger review authority. The twenty-five
challenges resulted in two mergers being blocked; three being
abandoned; and twenty being approved with conditions, including seven
with competitive-impact conditions. Hospital market concentration and
prices increased at similar rates in these eight states versus other states,
potentially because most challenges allowed mergers to proceed with
conditions that did not adequately address competitive concerns.
Although these findings do not reveal an optimal state framework,
elements of advanced state merger review authority may have the
potential to improve poorly functioning hospital markets.

H

ealth care provider markets in
the United States have consolidated into large hospital and
health systems.1 During 1998–
2017, 1,577 hospital mergers occurred,2 which contributed to 95 percent of hospital markets—defined as Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs)—being highly concentrated in
2018.3 Although horizontal hospital mergers
and acquisitions could theoretically generate
cost savings that are passed on to purchasers
and improve quality, studies have found mixed
or the opposite results: Consolidation is inconsistently associated with cost reductions4 but is
strongly associated with higher prices and simi-
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lar or reduced quality.5–9 Evidence is emerging
that cross-market hospital mergers can also lead
to higher prices.10 Higher hospital market concentration has also been associated with higher
Affordable Care Act Marketplace premiums11,12
and reductions in wage growth.13
Although concentration in health care markets has increased dramatically since the early
1990s,2,3,5,14 much of it has occurred with little to
no antitrust scrutiny.2,15,16 At the federal level, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) monitor market conduct, review proposed mergers, and engage in enforcement activities to foster competition.17 However,
limited time and resources prevent federal anti-
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trust enforcers from effectively monitoring and
challenging all anticompetitive mergers in
health care markets. Moreover, in 2021 the HartScott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976 notification threshold for a merger’s deal
value was $92 million, yet the median hospital
merger deal value during 2016–20 was, on average, $51 million, meaning that most mergers fell
below the federal notification threshold.18
State antitrust enforcement efforts bolster
and augment federal antitrust enforcement. Although state attorneys general can challenge
hospital mergers by filing a lawsuit under federal
or state antitrust laws or by joining a challenge
with the FTC, states can draw from a broader
range of authority to review potentially anticompetitive mergers.3,19,20 This authority resides in
the office of the state attorney general, a department of health, an agency specifically designed
to control health care costs, or a certificate-ofneed program. Legislatures have granted merger
review authority through laws governing charitable trusts, nonprofit corporations, health and
safety, and certificate-of-need programs.
Although merging entities can use the courts
to challenge administrative decisions arising
from these processes, the courts give deference
to state agency decisions unless they violate statutory or constitutional provisions; the agency
acted beyond its authority, engaged in an unlawful procedure, or made a clearly erroneous decision; or the decision was arbitrary and capricious. This standard makes these merger review
frameworks potentially more successful in preventing anticompetitive mergers compared with
states pursuing antitrust lawsuits, in which the
burden of proof rests with the state to demonstrate that the proposed merger is anticompetitive.
Many state merger review authority laws do
not explicitly focus on evaluating proposed hospital mergers from an antitrust perspective, instead focusing on objectives such as protecting
charitable assets. However, some states’ merger
review authorities do encompass competitionrelated concerns. Such authorities range from
only requiring notice of certain types of proposed mergers to empowering a state agency
to review and approve proposed mergers based
on how they affect competition. State laws only
requiring merging entities to notify a state agency of a proposed merger could also be used to
provide notice of potential mergers to the attorney general, who could bring an antitrust lawsuit. States with more robust merger review authority receive notice of a much wider range of
proposed mergers and are empowered to approve, conditionally approve, or block mergers
without having to go to court. In sum, these laws

serve as both complements and substitutes to
state and federal antitrust laws, by providing
information that can inform a state’s decision
to investigate and file suit under antitrust
laws or by supplying an administrative process
through which states can challenge mergers.
The objective of this observational study was to
analyze how various forms of state merger review authority are related to three outcomes: the
percentage of proposed hospital mergers that
were challenged during 2010–19, the change in
hospital market concentration from 2010 to
2019, and the change in inpatient hospital prices
from 2010 to 2016 (the latest year of hospital
price data). We classified each state’s merger review authority to analyze those relationships.We
hypothesized that states with stronger merger
review authority would challenge a higher share
of mergers, potentially moderating growth in
hospital market concentration and prices.

Richard M. Scheffler is a
distinguished professor
emeritus and director of the
Nicholas C. Petris Center,
University of California
Berkeley.

Study Data And Methods
Outcome Variables The outcome variables included the share of proposed hospital mergers
that were challenged, hospital market concentration, and hospital prices. Proposed hospital
mergers and acquisitions (hereafter “mergers”)
were identified using Irving Levin Associates’
annual Healthcare Services Acquisition Report.21
A proposed merger was defined as being challenged if a state, through its attorney general,
certificate-of-need program, or other state
health agency, attempted to block the merger
or impose conditions on its approval through
an administrative process or filing an antitrust
lawsuit, or if the merging entities likely abandoned the deal as a result of the state’s review
of the proposed merger. If a state or federal inquiry or investigation resulted in a merger being
approved without conditions, it was not counted
as a challenge. The challenges were determined
on the basis of the authors’ research of legal
databases, news sources, and federal and state
government websites.
We used the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) to measure market concentration. This
measure and the geographic and product market
definitions are explained in a prior study14 and
are summarized in the online appendix.22 The
HHI was calculated for each MSA during the
period 2010–19, using data from American Hospital Association Annual Survey Databases.23
Hospital prices were based on a standardized
hospital admission to account for admissionintensity differences among states, which affect
price. Prices were based on the amounts paid as
reported in the Health Care Cost Institute claims
data from the period 2010–16,24 and the mean
D e c em b e r 2 0 2 1
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price of a standardized hospital admission was
calculated each year at the MSA level. The Health
Care Cost Institute data pool medical claims from
three large US health insurers—Aetna, Humana,
and UnitedHealthcare—and cover, on average,
forty-two million people younger than age sixtyfive with commercial insurance per year from
every state and MSA. For additional detail on
the price measure, see the appendix22 and the
work of Christopher Whaley and colleagues.25
States’ Merger Review Authority States
can challenge proposed health care mergers in
court by using state and federal antitrust laws.
In this study we identified and reviewed additional state statutes that could be used to address
market consolidation, including statutes that require notification of proposed mergers; stipulate
merger review criteria; and grant a state agency
the authority to approve, conditionally approve,
or block proposed mergers. Statutes from all fifty
states and Washington, D.C., were identified using the Database of State Laws Impacting Healthcare Costs and Quality maintained by The Source
on Healthcare Price and Competition,26 state
legislative websites, and Westlaw.
We classified states into seven categories based
on the degree to which their merger review authority laws could be used to address health care
consolidation. The categories were determined
by whether the laws specifically pertain to health
care mergers; the scope of hospital mergers that
require notice (for example, nonprofit versus all
hospitals); the review criteria used by the agency
to analyze the merger (for example, competition-based criteria); and the agency’s authority
to approve, conditionally approve, or block the
proposed merger either administratively or by
filing a lawsuit in court. States were classified
according to the highest category of their statutes. In all categories, laws requiring merging
entities to notify a state agency can help the state
identify potentially anticompetitive mergers and
investigate whether to challenge a merger using
their merger review authority or antitrust laws.
The seven categories of merger review laws
were combined into the following three groups
based on the breadth of health care mergers that
the state received notice of and could review and
how explicitly the laws required a competitionbased review. (More details are in the appendix.)22
▸ CATEGORIES 1–3: The first group includes
states with no merger notification requirements
or authority to review proposed mergers
(category 1), states with merger notification requirements and authority to narrowly review
proposed mergers under general nonprofit corporation laws to ensure the charitable purposes
of the entities will continue after the merger
1838
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(category 2), and states with merger notification
requirements for health care mergers and narrow review authority under health care–specific
nonprofit laws or under certificate-of-need programs (category 3).
▸ CATEGORIES 4 AND 5: This group includes
states with health care–specific merger notification requirements and the authority to consider
cost, affordability, or access criteria to either
review (category 4) or approve (category 5) proposed mergers through either nonprofit merger
review or certificate-of-need programs. Although this authority potentially addresses competition-related concerns, the statutes do not
require this.
▸ CATEGORIES 6 AND 7: This group includes
states with health care–specific notification requirements and the authority to use competition-based criteria for the review of either nonprofit hospital mergers (category 6) or almost all
hospital mergers (category 7). Most states in this
group have the authority to approve, conditionally approve, or block mergers through administrative processes without having to go to court.
For example, Connecticut’s certificate-of-need
program in category 7 must consider the impact
of certain proposed mergers on competition as
part of its approval process. Although certificateof-need programs are considered to be anticompetitive because they create barriers to entry,27
Connecticut’s approach illustrates that such programs can be modified to potentially include
effective merger review processes.
Statistical Analyses We used regression
analysis for three sets of models to estimate
the association between states’ merger review
authority and hospital merger challenges, hospital market concentration, and hospital prices. In
this section we describe each set of regression
models in turn, but we begin by describing the
key independent variable—each state’s hospital
merger review authority category—because it is
the same in each model. The descriptive statistics
for each variable in the models are in appendix
exhibit A2.22 The key independent variable included a set of indicator variables—one for each
of the seven merger review authority categories.
In each set of regression models, model 1 included the seven categories of state laws, model 2
added covariates, and model 3 collapsed the state
laws into three groups: no review, nonprofit review, or certificate-of-need review (categories 1–
3, the reference group); cost, affordability, or
access review (categories 4 and 5); and competition-based review (categories 6 and 7).
To examine the association between states’
merger review authority and their likelihood of
challenging a proposed merger, we estimated a
logistic regression model at the merger level. The
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dependent variable was 1 if the proposed merger
was challenged and 0 otherwise. Because this
analysis focused on state-only challenges, we excluded challenges in which the state attorney
general joined a challenge brought by the FTC
or instances in which the FTC brought a challenge without any state involvement, which resulted in 855 proposed mergers, of which 35
were challenged. Our model controlled for several variables whose selection was informed by
a study that examined antitrust enforcement
by state attorneys general and was also based
on data availability28 (see the appendix for details).22
To examine the association between states’
merger review authority and the change in the
HHI for hospitals, we estimated a regression
model at the MSA level, excluding rural areas
because many contain only one hospital. The
dependent variable was the change in the HHI
for hospitals from 2010 to 2019. The models
controlled for the baseline hospital HHI in
2010 and changes in the following measures between 2010 and 2019 because they may affect the
change in hospital HHI: insurer HHI; population; median household income; uninsurance
rate; unemployment rate; Medicare Wage Index;
and percentages of commercial inpatient days,
for-profit hospitals, system hospitals, and major
teaching hospitals. The selection of these variables was informed by two studies29,30 and based
on data availability.
To examine the association between states’
merger review authority and the change in hospital prices, we estimated another regression
model at the MSA level. The dependent variable
was the change in the natural log of hospital
inpatient prices from 2010 to 2016. The model
controlled for the baseline hospital prices in
2010 and changes in the same measures (from
2010 to 2016) that the market concentration
model included, as changes in those measures
may also affect hospital inpatient prices.
Limitations This study had limitations. Although we tracked proposed hospital mergers
from initial report to consummation, rejection,
or abandonment, we may have missed some challenges, particularly conditional approvals that
impose minor conditions that were not publicly
reported. If more of these omitted challenges
were from states with merger approval authority,
as opposed to being from states without approval
authority that must challenge mergers in court,
which have more consistent public reporting requirements, then our regression-based estimate
of the additional share of mergers challenged by
these states would represent a lower bound. In
addition, because of the lack of public information, we were not able to include challenges in

which the state aided the FTC but did not join the
case, nor were we able to include informal inquiries by a state or the FTC that led to the merger
being abandoned before a formal challenge.
Our models estimated a well-controlled association between the outcomes and the categories
of merger review authority because they controlled for time-invariant outcome differences
among the categories of states and also for
time-varying confounding variables. Although
some of our models combined the seven categories of merger review laws into three groups, the
statistical power to detect a significant association was limited, particularly for a rare event
such as a proposed merger being challenged.
Because only four states changed merger review authority categories during the study period, there was insufficient variation to precisely
estimate within-state fixed effects models. In our
models the parameter estimates may be biased if
states that enacted more stringent statutes did so
in reaction to an outcome variable in a prior
period (also known as reverse causation) or if
confounding variables were omitted. Because
most states had already enacted their statutes
before the beginning of the study period, this
data limitation precluded us from assessing reverse causation. One potential confounding variable was the market concentration of hospitals
in the target hospital’s market because a proposed merger in a market with higher concentration will more likely be challenged. More than
half of recent mergers were across markets, involving targets in different MSAs than the acquiring hospital or system.10 Therefore, when
we included the hospital HHI of the target hospital’s MSA in the model, it could not be clearly
interpreted, so this variable was excluded. However, its exclusion did not substantively change
the main results.
Although MSAs are generally larger than markets defined by structural models, such as option
demand markets,31 they were used for analytic
convenience; however, their size dilutes the impact of mergers on market concentration. Finally, the regression models did not control for factors beyond the statutory framework that affect a
state’s ability to address health care consolidation, such as state agency resources and the practical application of the statutes.

Study Results
Merger Challenges During the period 2010–
19, 862 hospital mergers were proposed in the
United States, but only forty-two (or 4.9 percent)
were challenged, including seven challenges involving the FTC and thirty-five challenges only
involving state agencies (appendix exhibit A1
D e c e m b e r 20 2 1
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and “Supplemental Information on Federal Challenges” in the appendix).22 Exhibit 1 shows only
the 855 proposed mergers that did not involve a
federal challenge, of which states challenged
thirty-five (or 4.1 percent), resulting in two being
blocked, five being abandoned, and twenty-eight
being approved with conditions. The states in
categories 1–3 challenged only six (1.3 percent)
of the proposed mergers in their states. States
with the authority to use cost, affordability, and
access criteria to either review (category 4) or
approve (category 5) proposed mergers challenged only three (2.3 percent) and one (1.0 percent) proposed mergers, respectively. In contrast, states with authority to review and
approve proposed mergers using competitionbased criteria (categories 6 and 7) challenged
thirteen (11.1 percent) and twelve (54.5 percent),
respectively, accounting for the vast majority

(71.4 percent) of all challenges that occurred
during the study period. These states were also
more likely to use their antitrust laws to challenge a proposed merger, but they did so on
only four occasions (appendix exhibit A1).22
However, these states approved, with conditions, twenty of the twenty-five proposed mergers they challenged. Only seven approvals
included competition-related conditions, representing 5.0 percent of the proposed mergers in
these states. States in categories 1–5 approved
mergers with competition-related conditions for
only 3 of 716 (0.4 percent) proposed mergers
(exhibit A1).22
Mergers that occurred in states with more authority to review mergers were more likely than
mergers in other states to be challenged (exhibit 2). For example, model 3 shows that mergers
proposed in category 6 and 7 states were more

Exhibit 1
Number of proposed hospital mergers and challenges by state merger review authority category, 2010–19
No. of
proposed
mergers,
2010–19b

No. of
challenges,
2010–19b

Percent of
mergers
challenged

Outcome of
challenges

State merger review authority categories

No. of states in category, 2019a

1: No statute

11: AL, AK, AR, FL, IA, KS, NM,
NV, OK, TX, UT, IL (2010–18),
SD (2010–15)

237

0

0.0

None

2: General nonprofit review

9: IN, MO, MN, MT, NC, NY, SC,
SD (2016–19), WY

134

3

2.2

1 abandoned,
2 approved
with conditions

3: Health care–specific nonprofit or CON review

9: DC, ID, KY, ME, ND, OH, WI,
WV, IL (2019), CT (2010–13)

107

3

2.8

1 abandoned,
2 approved
with conditions

4: Health care–specific nonprofit review includes
cost, affordability, or access criteria

6: AZ, CO, GA, LA, TN, VA,
MA (2010–12)

133

3c

2.3

3 approved with
conditions

5: Health care–specific nonprofit or CON approval
includes cost, affordability, or access criteria

8: DE, MD, MI, MS, NE, NJ,
VT, WA

105

1

1.0

1 approved with
conditions

6: Health care–specific nonprofit or CON notice
to attorney general and approval based on
competition-based criteria

5: CA, NH, OR, PA,
MA (2013–19)

117

13

11.1

2 blocked,
2 abandoned,
9 approved
with conditions

7: Health care–specific notice for all proposed
mergers and approval based on competitionbased criteria
Total

3: HI, RI, CT (2014–19)

22

12d

54.5

51

855

35

4.1

1 abandoned,
11 approved
with conditions
2 blocked,
5 abandoned,
28 approved
with conditions

SOURCE Authors’ analysis of state statutes and merger challenges and Irving Levin Associates’ annual Healthcare Services Acquisition Report (note 21 in text). NOTES
Exhibit A1 is a more detailed version of this exhibit (see note 22 in text), listing the state and state agency that challenged the proposed mergers and including challenges
that involved the federal government. CON is certificate-of-need. aThe number of states (including Washington, D.C.) reported by category is as of December 31, 2019, and
the years reported next to Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, and South Dakota are the years those states were classified in that specific category. bThe number of
proposed mergers includes only mergers whose challenges did not have Federal Trade Commission involvement, which is consistent with the logistic regression model
(exhibit 2). In addition, the number of proposed mergers and challenges by category accounts for the four states (Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, and South Dakota)
that changed categories during the study period by assigning proposed mergers and challenges to the category that the state was classified in the year of the proposed
merger. cVirginia and Tennessee both imposed conditions via Certificates of Public Advantage for the same merger, so those imposed conditions were counted as one
challenge. dRhode Island and Connecticut imposed conditions on the same merger, so those challenges were counted as one challenge.
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Exhibit 2
Relative odds of hospital mergers being challenged in US states, by state merger review authority category and selected characteristics, 2010–19
Regression results
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Variables

aOR

SE

aOR

SE

aOR

SE

State merger review authority
Categories 1–2
Category 3
Category 4
Category 5
Category 6
Category 7
Categories 1–3
Categories 4–5
Categories 6–7

Ref
3.54*
3.80
1.18
14.0***
147***
—a
—a
—a

2.67
3.63
1.09
10.8
90.5
—a
—a
—a

Ref
4.07**
3.83**
1.04
10.6***
104***
—a
—a
—a

2.73
2.60
1.12
6.57
76.5
—a
—a
—a

—a
—a
—a
—a
—a
—a
Ref
1.56
11.6***

—a
—a
—a
—a
—a
—a

Democratic attorney general
County population (100,000s)

—a
—a

—a
—a

1.85
1.05

1.22
0.0442

2.26
1.02

1.42
0.0510

County median household income ($10,000s)

—a

—a

1.42***

0.142

1.40***

0.131

County unemployment rate (%)
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016–17
2018
2019

—
—a
—a
—a
—a
—a
—a
—a
—a
—a

—a
—a
—a
—a
—a
—a
—a
—a
—a
—a

1.00
Ref
2.29
1.06
2.00
0.922
1.04
0.180**
0.815
0.274

0.0000167

0.0000187

2.17
0.981
2.47
1.14
1.22
0.150
1.19
0.329

1.00
Ref
2.30
1.23
1.70
0.741
1.25
0.247*
1.34
0.258

2.14
1.19
2.26
0.871
1.53
0.201
1.73
0.296

Constant

0.00813***

0.00443

0.00832***

0.000677

0.00137***

0.00111

a

1.01
6.70

SOURCE Authors’ analysis of state statutes and merger challenges, Irving Levin Associates’ annual Healthcare Services Acquisition Report (note 21 in text), American
Hospital Association Annual Survey Database, and Area Health Resources File. NOTES The three models use the same dependent variable indicating whether a proposed
merger was challenged, but they include different sets of independent variables as described in the text. The N for each regression model was 855 (instead of 862) because
seven proposed mergers whose challenges involved the Federal Trade Commission were removed. The pseudo R 2 values for models 1, 2, and 3 were 0.257, 0.342, and
0.278, respectively. The year indicator variables for 2016 and 2017 were combined because the model could not estimate a parameter for the year 2016 by itself, as no
proposed mergers were challenged that year. State merger review authority categories 1 and 2 were combined for the same reason; specifically, no proposed mergers
were challenged in category 1. Results are presented as adjusted odds ratios. The constant term estimates baseline odds. Standard errors (SEs) were estimated by
clustering at the state level. aOR is adjusted odds ratio. aIndependent variable was not included in the model. *p < 0:10 **p < 0:05 ***p < 0:01

likely to be challenged (adjusted odds ratio:
11.59; p < 0.01) compared with mergers proposed in category 1–3 states (the reference
group).
Market Concentration Next, we turn to the
hospital market concentration results. The unadjusted mean hospital HHI increased by a similar percentage from 2010 to 2019 in states with
different merger review authority, ranging from
7.3 percent in MSAs in states in categories 1–3
and categories 6 and 7 to 9.4 percent in MSAs in
states in categories 4 and 5 (appendix exhibit
A3).22 Exhibit 3 shows the regression results
for the changes in HHI at the MSA level from
2010 to 2019. In these models the state merger
review categories were not consistently associated with a change in the hospital HHI. Model 3
shows that neither competition-based review
(categories 6 and 7) nor review based on cost,
affordability, or access (categories 4 and 5) was

associated with a change in the hospital HHI.
Prices When we examined the hospital price
results, the null findings persisted. The unadjusted mean hospital price for a standardized
admission increased by a similar percentage
from 2010 to 2016 in states with different merger
review authorities, ranging from 24.4 percent in
MSAs in states with category 4 and 5 levels of
authority to 28.7 percent in MSAs in states with
category 1–3 levels (see appendix exhibit A4).22
Exhibit 4 shows the regression results from an
MSA-level model in which the dependent variable is the change in the natural log of the mean
standardized inpatient hospital price level from
2010 to 2016. In these models, the state merger
review categories were not consistently associated with a change in hospital prices. States in
category 7 approached being associated with
higher hospital prices in 2016 compared with
2010 (model 2, coefficient = 0.245; p < 0.10),
D ec e m b er 2 0 2 1
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Exhibit 3
Change in hospital Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in US states, by state merger review authority category and selected characteristics, 2010–19
Regression results
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

SE

Parameter
estimate

SE

Parameter
estimate

140
176
227
161
143
177
—a
—a
—a

—a
—a
—a
—a
—a
—a
—a
Ref
185
11.1

151
121

Variables

Parameter
estimate

State merger review authority
Category 1
Category 2
Category 3
Category 4
Category 5
Category 6
Category 7
Categories 1–3
Categories 4–5
Categories 6–7

Ref
208
97.7
377*
135
37.7
122
—a
—a
—a

157
201
210
168
167
220
—a
—a
—a

Ref
170*
14.2
340
97.7
69.1
−96.0
—a
—a
—a

Hospital HHI, 2010
Change in insurer HHI

−0.0746***
—a

0.0144
—a

−0.104***
−0.0824

0.0157
0.0623

−0.103***
−0.0583

0.0157
0.0627

Change in MSA population (100,000s)

—a

—a

−104***

36.2

−101***

33.2

Change in median household income ($10,000s)
Change in uninsurance rate (pp)

a

—
—a

—a
—a

−1,245*
−4.92

735
16.9

−1,321*
−3.42

722
16.3

Change in unemployment rate (pp)

—a

—a

34.7

21.2

31.6

21.4

Change in Medicare wage index
Change in percent of commercial inpatient days (pp)

a

—
—a

—a
—a

302
−0.309

547
5.03

271
−0.393

582
5.02

Change in percent of for-profit hospitals (pp)

—a

—a

−7.80

5.97

−7.74

5.90

Change in percent of system hospitals (pp)
Change in percent of major teaching hospitals (pp)

—
—a

—a
—a

5.00**
−2.38

2.00
3.84

5.27**
−2.56

1.98
3.70

Constant

716***

134

1,220***

161

1,258***

154

a

SE
—a
—a
—a
—a
—a
—a
—a

SOURCE Authors’ analysis of state statutes and merger challenges, American Hospital Association Annual Survey Database, and Area Health Resources File. NOTES The
three models use the same dependent variable—the change in hospital HHI—but they include different sets of independent variables as described in the text. Each model
includes 381 of the 382 MSAs; one MSA had missing hospital HHI data. The R2 values for models 1, 2, and 3 were 0.0581, 0.128, 0.120, respectively. The states that
switched categories during the study period were included in the category in which they were for the majority of the study period, including Connecticut in category 7,
Illinois in category 1, Massachusetts in category 6, and South Dakota in category 1. Standard errors (SEs) were estimated by clustering at the state level. Changes in
variables are from 2010 to 2019. MSA is Metropolitan Statistical Area. pp is percentage points. aIndependent variable was not included in the model. *p < 0:10
**p < 0:05 ***p < 0:01

but the association did not reach the conventional 0.05 significance level.

Discussion
Hospital markets are not functioning well in the
United States, and hospital mergers have led to
less competitive markets.2 In response, some
states have begun enhancing antitrust enforcement and oversight, two critical elements within
Martin Gaynor’s framework to address the lack
of competition in health care markets.32 The laws
we reviewed serve as both complements and substitutes to the authority granted to state attorneys general and federal antitrust agencies to
challenge mergers under antitrust law.
As complements, the notification and review
requirements in the state merger review laws can
alert state attorneys general of potentially anticompetitive mergers, which is important for pro1842
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posed mergers that do not meet the federal notification threshold under the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act.33 This notification
can inform the state’s decision to challenge a
proposed merger or initiate an investigation,
which in some cases can cause the entities to
abandon the merger altogether. Furthermore,
some of these laws require state agencies to devote resources to examining proposed mergers,
which may provide useful evidence to enforcement agencies if they bring a case under state or
federal antitrust laws.
As substitutes, some laws create administrative processes through which state agencies or
attorneys general can review, and in some states
challenge, mergers. Many of these merger approval processes offer an alternative mechanism
to litigation for ensuring prompt and accurate
reviews of mergers and, where appropriate, for
blocking mergers. If merging entities challenge
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Exhibit 4
Change in natural log of hospital prices in US states, by state merger review authority category and selected characteristics, 2010–16
Regression results
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

SE

Parameter
estimate

SE

Parameter
estimate

0.0281
0.0359
0.0336
0.0467
0.0370
0.145
—a
—a
—a

—a
—a
—a
—a
—a
—a
—a
Ref
−0.0147
−0.0224

0.0282
0.0301

0.0254
1.68E-05

−0.134***
−2.88E-06

0.0250
1.80E-05

Variables

Parameter
estimate

State merger review authority
Category 1
Category 2
Category 3
Category 4
Category 5
Category 6
Category 7
Categories 1–3
Categories 4–5
Categories 6–7

Ref
0.0343
0.0984***
0.000949
0.00678
0.0144
0.269*
—a
—a
—a

0.0240
0.0344
0.0324
0.0525
0.0252
0.146
—a
—a
—a

Ref
0.0489*
0.120***
0.0327
0.0257
0.0113
0.245*
—a
—a
—a

Hospital prices, 2010 ($ natural log)
Change in insurer HHI

−0.117***
—a

0.0243
—a

−0.136***
−4.69E-06

Change in MSA population (100,000s)

—a

—a

0.0195***

0.00599

0.0147**

0.00621

Change in median household income ($10,000s)
Change in uninsurance rate (pp)

a

—
—a

—a
—a

0.567
−0.00211

0.341
0.00471

0.719**
0.00102

0.342
0.00503

Change in unemployment rate (pp)

—a

—a

0.000219

0.00665

−0.00234

0.00683

Change in Medicare wage index
Change in percent of commercial inpatient days (pp)

a

—
—a

—a
—a

0.175**
0.00331**

0.0817
0.00140

0.202**
0.00305**

0.0899
0.00146

Change in percent of for-profit hospitals (pp)

—a

—a

0.000189

0.000606

0.0000989

0.000533

Change in percent of system hospitals (pp)
Change in percent of major teaching hospitals (pp)

—
—a

—a
—a

−0.000159
−0.00372*

0.000344
0.00191

−8.21E-06
−0.00292

0.000344
0.00194

Constant

1.35***

0.228

1.48***

0.231

1.51***

0.232

a

SE
—a
—a
—a
—a
—a
—a
—a

SOURCE Authors’ analysis of state statutes and merger challenges, Health Care Cost Institute claims data, American Hospital Association Annual Survey Database, and
Area Health Resources File. NOTES The three models use the same dependent variable (the change in natural log of hospital price), but they include different sets of
independent variables. Each model includes 380 of the 382 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs); 2 MSAs had missing hospital price data. The R 2 values for models 1, 2,
and 3 were 0.102, 0.161, and 0.112, respectively. The states that switched categories during the 2010–16 period were included in the category in which they were for the
majority of this period, including Connecticut in category 3, Illinois in category 1, Massachusetts in category 6, and South Dakota in category 1. Standard errors (SEs) were
estimated by clustering at the state level. Changes in variables are from 2010 to 2016. HHI is Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. pp is percentage points. aIndependent variable
was not included in the model. *p < 0:10 **p < 0:05 ***p < 0:01

agency decisions, courts will grant the agency
deference and require a lower burden of proof
than if the attorney general had challenged the
merger under antitrust laws in court.
Despite these merger review authority and antitrust laws, our findings reveal that relatively
few proposed hospital mergers were challenged
under antitrust laws or administrative merger
review processes during 2010–19, even though
more than 90 percent of MSAs had a highly concentrated hospital market.3,14 In that period only
42 of 862 (4.9 percent) proposed hospital mergers were challenged by states or the FTC, with
only 12 (1.4 percent) being blocked or abandoned. However, when we examined the thirty-five challenges from states that did not involve
the FTC, twenty-five challenges (71.4 percent)
originated in the eight states with the most robust merger review authority (categories 6 and
7), resulting in those states challenging 18.0 per-

cent of their proposed mergers, in contrast to
states with less merger review authority, which
challenged only 1.4 percent of their proposed
mergers. Yet hospital market concentration
and prices increased at similar rates in category
6 and 7 states compared with other states, potentially because twenty of the twenty-five challenges from those states resulted in merger approvals with conditions that did not address
competitive concerns.
Our results suggest that more robust merger
approval authority alone will not moderate
hospital consolidation and price increases. Although states in categories 6 and 7 challenged
a higher share of hospital mergers than other
states, these challenges frequently resulted in
conditional approval of proposed mergers, allowing the markets to further consolidate, instead of having the mergers be either blocked
or approved with conditions that included strucDecember 2 021
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Hospitals
tural remedies, such as requiring the merged
entity to divest facilities that create risk for anticompetitive harm. In addition, these states often
failed to impose conditions to mitigate potential
increases in price or diminution in quality resulting from the merger. Instead, many conditions
reflected other state priorities, such as ensuring
continued access to services for women’s reproductive care and vulnerable populations or
fulfillment of charitable purposes by nonprofit
entities. When conditions did address market
power, they often imposed time-limited restrictions that permitted growth in market power but
delayed the ability to use it. Although we did not
find evidence that merger challenges moderated
hospital price increases in these states, retrospective studies could analyze the effects of these
challenges on postmerger prices.
Although our findings do not reveal an optimal
state merger review authority framework, we
contend that the advanced state merger review
authority elements—including notification requirements; competition-based merger review
criteria; and the power to approve, conditionally
approve, or block anticompetitive mergers—may
have the potential to improve poorly functioning
hospital markets. The frameworks require further study, however, to answer questions such as
the following: What aspects of state merger review authority are most effective at deterring and
blocking anticompetitive mergers, and which
are most effective at mitigating harms arising
from consummated mergers? To what extent
do state funding and expertise limitations constrain merger review and hospital antitrust enforcement? In what circumstances should states
and federal antitrust agencies partner to review
proposed mergers? Additional research is needed to understand whether more rigorous use of
competition-based enforcement tools, including
structural remedies (such as blocking the merger
or divestitures) and competitive impact conditions (such as caps on postmerger price increases) can effectively promote competition
The authors thank the participants of
the UC Hastings and UC Berkeley
Workshop on State Merger Review
Authority and Addressing
Anticompetitive Contract Terms in
Insurer/Provider Contracts, held via
Zoom on November 13, 2020, for their
comments on a draft of the manuscript.
Funding for this study was provided by
Arnold Ventures (Grant No. 19-02464).
Samuel Chang contributed to this study
while he was employed at the University
of California Hastings College of the
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and restrain price growth or whether regulatory
interventions such hospital rate setting are required to achieve these goals. The findings from
these studies could further equip states to design
and implement advanced merger review authority frameworks to address poorly functioning
hospital markets.

Conclusion
For state merger reviews to effectively constrain
market power, merger challenges need to specifically address the core problem of excessive market concentration by blocking anticompetitive
mergers; imposing structural remedies, such
as divestitures of facilities; or attaching conditions designed to prevent abuses of market
power, such as anticompetitive price increases
and anticompetitive contract clauses.34
States could play a critically important role in
addressing poorly functioning hospital markets
because federal antitrust enforcement is limited
by resource constraints, high Hart-Scott-Rodino
filing thresholds, less flexible merger review authority, and less knowledge of local market conditions.20 With mounting evidence of the anticompetitive effects of hospital consolidation,2
coupled with the increasing trend of consolidation moving beyond horizontal mergers to include vertical and cross-market mergers as well
as joint ventures, management contracts, and
affiliations,35 having an effective antitrust enforcement framework is imperative. The handful
of states that have developed more robust hospital merger review authority—which includes
notification requirements; competition-based
merger review criteria; and the power to approve, conditionally approve, or block potentially anticompetitive mergers—challenged a higher
percentage of hospital mergers than other states.
Further study of these states’ hospital merger
review frameworks can provide insights into improving hospital merger review. ▪
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